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Abstract 
Purpose- This research aims to examine the relationship between 
real earnings management (REM) and sticky Selling General and 
Administrative (SG&A) costs in the case of a developing economy. 
Design/Methodology- The study employed a purposive sampling 
method. Fifteen firms listed on Ghana stock exchange were 
selected for the study. Data from the period of 2005 to 20014 were 
collected. 
Findings- The study finds Ghanaian listed firm's SG&A cost to be 
sticky and also see these firms to manipulate earnings through 
REM. This study finds that REM through discretionary expenses 
and production cost increases sticky SG&A cost, whereas REM 
through cash flow reduces sticky SG&A cost. Overall, the results 
imply that REM exhibit sticky cost. 
Practical Implications- The study informs managers that cost is not 
only fixed or variable but also behaves asymmetrically. The 
understanding of this concept could help managers to implement 
strategies that will lower the cost of doing business. Also, since 
some managers deliberately make decisions that lead to real 
earnings management and sticky cost, we, therefore, believe that 
this research will be of importance to regulatory bodies, 
policymakers, investors, and other stakeholders. 
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Introduction 
This paper is an integration of financial accounting and management accounting topics, which are real earnings 
management and cost structure, respectively. Both are researches that have been linked to managerial 
opportunism. Cost is the expenditure incurred in the production of goods and services. In financial and 
management accounting, the cost is measured in monetary value, and it is one of the essential concepts. Costs 
are grouped into four broad elements, which are labor cost, material cost, expenses, and overheads. Each aspect 
may also be classified as manufacturing and non-manufacturing cost. Manufacturing cost is the cost that is 
directly involved in the production of goods (eg., direct labor cost, direct material cost, and direct overhead 
cost). Also, the non-manufacturing cost is the cost that cannot directly be linked to production (eg., SG&A 
cost, and Rent). 
Furthermore, the traditional cost model classifies cost as fixed or variable and fixed and variable. However, 
recent studies have found the cost to behave differently from the conventional cost system (eg., Anderson et 
al., 2003). They claim that cost behaves in an asymmetric manner, which they termed as sticky cost. 
The literature on sticky cost has been a popular topic of research over the last two decades among researchers 
studying the behavior of cost. According to Anderson et al., (2003), sticky behavior of cost is present if the rate 
at which a firm's cost increases as business operations increase is higher compared to its cost decrease as 
business operations declines. The traditional cost model, in contrast, indicates that variable cost increases or 
decreases in proportion to changes to activity volume (Noreen, 1991). A lot of researchers have conducted 
studies on the sticky behavior of cost (Weiss, 2010; He et al., 2010). Many have found the cost to be sticky 
among variables such as SG&A, COGS and adjustment cost (Liang et al., 2015; Anderson et al., 2003). 
Balakrishnan et al. (2004) found the cost to be sticky when they conducted a study on physical therapy clinics 
in the US. 
Furthermore, Anderson et al. (2003) believe that managers intentionally create sticky cost behavior to achieve 
sure firm performance. In theory, this opportunistic behavior of managers has been documented by earnings 
management research (Roychowdhury, 2006; Graham et al., 2005). Broadly, we define earnings management as 
the strategies and techniques managers adopt in the preparation and reporting of firm performance, which hides 
the actual performance of the firm. Earnings management can be categorized into three broad topics, namely, 
accrual earnings management, real earnings management, and fraudulent accounting. This paper, however, 
concentrates on practical earnings management. 
Moreover, there are different avenues for or types of real earnings management activities. For instance, 
managers can manage earnings through cash flow, production, discretionary expenses, SG&A, sale of fixed 
assets, research and development expenditure and many others. Our research concentrates on real earnings 
management through production, discretionary expenses, and cash flow from operations. Firm managers who 
indulge in practical earnings management change the underlying operational activities. For instance, 
Roychowdhury, (2006) found evidence indicating that managers overproduce to declare the lower cost of goods 
sold.  Other examples also include delaying investment and selling fixed assets in an attempt to increase earnings 
(Gunny, (2005). 
This research aims to examine the relationship between real earnings management and cost behavior. The study 
sought to; identify the cost behavior of SG&A, assess the existence of actual activity manipulations, and finally 
establish a relationship between real earnings management and cost behavior of listed firms in Ghana. 
Our study makes the following contributions to literature. Firstly it contributes to the literature on the 
relationship between earnings management and sticky cost. Prior studies provide strong evidence. For instance, 
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Xue and Hong (2015) found evidence indicating that both earnings management and sticky cost moves in the 
opposite direction, meaning as earnings management increases sticky cost diminishes. Consequently, the more 
a firm indulges in earnings management, the less sticky its cost will be. Also Hemati and Javid, (2017) provided 
evidence on the effect of real earnings management on sticky cost, but these and many other papers concentrate 
on accrual earnings management and sticky cost, and therefore provides very little evidence on the relationship 
between the three real earnings management proxies used in this study (i.e., real earnings management through; 
production cost, discretionary expenses, and cash flow from operations) and the behavior of SG&A cost. This 
study, therefore, addresses this issue by studying the relationship between the three individual real earnings 
management proxies and the cost behavior of SG&A. Our paper goes further to contribute by computing real 
earnings management as one variable from the three individual proxies and assessing its total effects on SG&A 
cost behavior. We do this by combining the standardized residuals of the three individual real earnings 
management proxies. 
Secondly, our paper makes a further contribution to the existing literature by studying the presence of real 
earnings management and sticky behavior of SG&A costs among listed firms in Ghana. Previous studies on 
earnings management have been biased towards real earnings management in the Ghanaian context. For 
instance, Yiadom, (2016), and Amidu and Kuipo (2015) focused on accrual earnings management. It was also 
realized through the review of literature that cost behavior, sticky or non-sticky has not been discussed in the 
Ghanaian context. Therefore, there was a need to assess the existence of real earnings management and sticky 
behavior of cost from the viewpoint of a developing economy.   
In measuring the behavior of SG&A cost of listed firms in Ghana, the model of Anderson et al., (2003) was 
adopted. The study tested the behavior of selling, general, and administrative cost (SG&A) of these firms. 
Furthermore, in measuring real earnings management, the study estimated the abnormal level of cash flow from 
operations, production cost and discretionary expenses using the logarithm model of Roychowdhury (2006). 
The study also used an ordinary least square (OLS) model to assess the relationship between real earnings 
management and cost behavior. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the review of the literature and the 
development of the hypothesis. Section 3 also talks about the data and methodology used in this study. Sections 
4 present the results and discussion of the results. Finally, section 5 concludes.   
Literature Review 
Agency theory 
Our research is grounded in agency theory. Agency theory suggests that no agent is trustworthy due to 
information asymmetry and the self-seeking behavior of agents. Due to shareholders' unavailability or lack of 
appropriate training to manage their businesses, they hire managers and leave the day to day decision making 
and running of the business in the hands of their firm managers. Agency theory predicts that these managers 
may act opportunistically, leading shareholders into putting in a mechanism that can monitor firm managers, 
which also results in agency cost (ICAEW, 2005). According to Anderson et al., (2003), agency problems may 
lead to sticky behavior of cost since managers intentionally manipulate cost in reaction to changes in sales. 
Kama & Weis (2012) also argue that managers deliberately manage production, which then leads to sticky 
behavior of cost. 
Also, earnings management practices have been linked to the opportunistic behavior of managers by prior 
researchers. For instance, Gunny (2005) argues that managers deliberately reduce research and development 
expenditure to increase earnings.  
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Sticky cost 
Due to the increase in the number of businesses and the complex nature of today’s market competition, it is 
very important for management accountants to understand the nature and the behavior of cost in order to take 
timely decisions that could lower cost of doing business and increase cost-effectiveness so that companies can 
survive and pay back good returns to shareholders. The traditional cost model classifies cost as either fixed or 
variable, where the variable cost depends on activity level. When cost starts to behave in an asymmetric manner 
that is when we say cost is sticky (Anderson & Lanen, 2009). For instance, Banker et al., (2011) claimed that 
sticky cost or cost stickiness happens when managers intentionally decide to maintain unused resources instead 
of spending on adjustment cost when activity level decreases. This implies that firm managers can deliberately 
take decisions and steps that will lead to cost management. 
Furthermore, He et al. (2010) conducted a study on sticky SG&A cost behavior and its rate of change in Japan. 
They found that Japanese firms SG&A costs are sticky and it is similar to US firms. Besides, they pointed out 
that managers may manage costs due to two main issues. The first one may be due to agency problems. 
According to agency theory, agency problems arise when managers make decisions that maximize their utilities 
instead of making decisions that maximize the services of their agents. This means managers may decide to 
maintain unutilized recourses that come with a cost even though sales revenue may be declining. The second 
issue, according to He et al. (2010) may be due to managers' uncertainty about the future. Managers may decide 
to retain unused resources because they assume it may be of use soon when sales increase again. 
Similarly, Kama & Weiss (2012) found two possible sources of sticky cost. Firstly, they found that companies 
that were limited in terms of technology exhibited sticky costs. Secondly, they found that managers deliberately 
interfere in production to fulfill their desires, which then leads to cost stickiness in the long run. Aside from 
these issues, corporate governance characteristics such as gender and age of chairperson have also been linked 
to cost stickiness in firms (Liang et al., 2015). Nonetheless, Anderson et al. (2003) found a sample of listed firms 
in the US to have sticky SG&A costs. They discovered that SG&A went up by 0.55% when revenue increased 
by 1% as compared to a decline of 0.35% when revenue went down by 1%. 
Similarly, Kokotakis et al. (2013) conducted a study on sticky cost on Greek food, beverages, and tobacco 
limited companies. They sampled 438 limited companies for 12 years. They found that a 1% increase in revenue 
leads to a rise in the expense of about 1.011% whiles a 1% decrease in income leads to a reduction in expense 
of about 0.905%. However, Weiss (2010) and Banker et al. (2013) found the cost to be anti sticky. The latter 
claims that expenses are anti sticky when the economy is weak. Based on the literature reviewed we propose 
our first primary hypothesis as; listed firms in Ghana exhibit sticky behavior of cost.  
Real earnings management 
Healy & Wahlen, (1999) define earnings management as "Earnings management occurs when managers use 
judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes 
that depend on reported accounting practices." From this definition, it is clear that managers have ulterior 
motives the moment they indulge in earnings management. There are a lot of motivations for managers to 
indulge in earnings management. Examples are the debt covenant motivation, the bonus plan motivation, and 
also the political cost motivation. Also, Management can manipulate earnings through accruals, fraudulent 
accounting, or through real activities. This paper concentrates on real activities manipulations, also known as 
real earnings management. Roychowdhury, (2006) define real activities manipulation as "Management actions 
that deviate from normal business practices, undertaken with the primary objective of meeting certain earnings 
threshold." According to this definition, managers adopt strategies that go off course from the expected way 
of conducting business to achieve a specific target. He found evidence indicating that managers manipulate 
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earnings through real activities to escape reporting annual losses. He further found that managers offered price 
discounts to customers to temporarily boost sales. He also documented that management indulges in 
overproduction to announce lower COGS. 
Furthermore, he found evidence indicating that firm managers decrease discretionary expenditures so that they 
can improve reported margins. Moreover, Gunny (2005) found evidence indicating some strategies managers 
use to manage earnings through real activities. She noted that managers reduce R&D expenditure to increase 
revenue. Managers also manipulate SG&A expenditure so that revenue could be improved. She also mentioned 
that managers sometimes time the recognition of loss or profit made on the disposal of assets and investment. 
Also, Bushee (1998) found evidence that managers decrease R&D expenditures so that they can achieve 
earnings benchmarks. Besides, Graham et al. (2005) conducted a study by surveying financial managers about 
factors that determine decisions on reported earnings and voluntary reporting. They found that 78% of the 
managers surveyed had a motive to sacrifice economic value to manipulate financial reporting perceptions. 
Recent researchers have detected that managers have switched from accrual-based earnings management to real 
earnings management since it is hard to detect. For instance, Cohen et al. (2008) documented that firm managers 
have switched from accrual manipulations to real activities manipulation during the post-Sarbanes-Oxley 
period. Various regulatory bodies are now aware of the effect of accrual earnings management and, therefore, 
have put in place robust measures to detect and sanction culprits. Due to this reason, managers now manipulate 
earnings via real activities, which are hard to detect. We, therefore, propose our second primary hypothesis as; 
listed firms in Ghana manage earnings through real activities. 
Sticky cost and real earnings management 
Hemati and Javid (2017) did a study on the effects of earnings management and corporate governance on 
expense stickiness. They sampled 112 firms from the period of 2010 to 2016, resulting in 672 firm years. They 
concluded that earnings management has a significant effect on expense stickiness. However, Xue and Hong 
(2015) found slightly similar evidence when they also conducted a study on earnings management, corporate 
governance, and sticky cost. They found evidence indicating the presence of sticky cost among the earnings 
management sub-sample but found a much more significant amount of sticky cost among the non-earnings 
management sub-sample. 
Furthermore, they found that managers decrease general expenses to control expenses. They finally concluded 
that as earnings management increases, the sticky cost significantly reduces. Similar to Xue and Hong (2015), 
Kama and Weiss (2010) also investigated the sticky cost and found that companies that were found to have 
indulged in earnings management recorded a small amount of expense stickiness in their operating expenses. 
Also, Koo et al. (2015)investigated the effects of incentives for earnings management on the stickiness of SG&A 
expenses. They used US firms with financial data from the period of 1997 to 2007. They found that earnings 
management suspect companies mitigate cost stickiness when they encounter a reduction in sales. They claimed 
that it could be a result of managers aggressively manipulating expenses for earnings management. They 
concluded that firms that tested high for earnings management manipulations have weaker cost stickiness 
compared to others, but Chen et al. (2008) finds that firms with higher sticky cost also had stronger incentives 
for managers to manipulate. They found this when they conducted a study on the relationship between empire 
building and perk.  
Few studies dispute the fact that firms' cost behavior alone can determine the manager's intentions towards 
cost management. For instance, Anderson and Lanen (2009) argue that firms' cost behavior alone is not enough 
evidence to distinguish between the mechanical and the managerial motivation of cost management when they 
conducted a literature review on the theories, the empirical works, and data employed in cost stickiness 
literature. They found problems relating to adjustment cost which had incomplete theories and how convincible 
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these theories match their empirical test. Moreover, Kama and Weiss (2012) did a study that explored the 
motivations underlying manager’s resource adjustment. They found that when managers are faced with the 
temptations to avoid losses or to meet analyst’s forecasts they speed up the process of downward change of 
slack resources for revenue reductions. This we believe could lead to earnings management and sticky behavior 
of cost. We, therefore, propose our third primary hypothesis as; firms that engage in real earnings management 
are more likely to exhibit sticky cost. 
Methodology 
Sample selection 
The study employed a purposive sampling method. Fifteen firms listed on Ghana stock exchange were selected 
for the study. Data from the period of 2005 to 20014 were collected from the Ghana Stock Exchange website 
between April and June 2017. All the variables collected were the variables needed to calculate the sticky cost 
behavior of firms and also real earnings management. All financial and insurance firms were excluded from the 
study. The final sample contains 168 firm-year observations.  
Measuring sticky cost 
The researcher follows the model used by Anderson et al. (2003). This paper uses the same logarithm model to 
measure the degree of cost stickiness. 
Log (SGAit / SGAit-1) = β0 + β1 log (Salesit / Salesit-1) + β2 Dummy × log (Salesit / Salesit-1) + Ɛit   (1) 
Where SGA represents selling, general and administration expenses, sales are net sales. Dummy is a dummy 
variable where the value one is given if the current year sales decline and 0 if otherwise and Ɛ represent the 
error term. The “i” and “t” indicates firm and year respectively. Firms would be found to have exhibited a sticky 
cost if β2 is less than zero (0).  
3.3 Measuring real earnings management 
This paper follows the methods of previous studies such as Roychowdhury, (2006). He estimated the normal 
levels of real activities manipulation through production cost, discretionary expenses, and cash flow from 
operations. Studies such as Gunny (2010) and Cohen et al. (2008) provide evidence of how valid these proxies 
are. This paper uses the aggregate of the abnormal levels of these three metrics to measure the level of real 
earnings management. This paper also uses each abnormal level separately to measure the level of real earnings 
management. The paper, first of all, calculates the normal level of the three proxies using equations (2), (3), and 
(4) and then subtracts the normal level from the actual level of these proxies to get the abnormal levels. 
To estimate the average level of cash flow from operations, equation (2) is used. 
CFOit/Ait-1=β0 + β1 1/Ait-1 + β2Salesit/Ait-1 + β3∆Salesit/Ait-1 + Ɛit   (2)                                                               
Where CFO is cash flow from operations in the company i at time t, A is total assets in company i at time t, 
Sales is the company's revenue or turnover in the company i at time t and ∆Sales is a change in sales in company 
i at time t. 
Equation (2) is used to estimate the average level of cash flow. It is used to detect real earnings manipulations 
through sales discounts and lenient credit terms. These two strategies will, in the long run, reduce cash flows in 
the current period. 
To estimate the average level of discretionary expenses equation (3) is used.                        
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Disc.Expit/Ait-1=β0 + β1 1/Ait-1 + β2Salesit/Ait-1 + Ɛit   (3)  
Where, Disc.Exp is the summation of administrative and selling expenses.  
Equation (3) is used to detect real earnings manipulations through discretionary expenses. Firm managers who 
manipulate earnings through discretionary expenses reduce expenses such as SG&A, R&D, and Advertising 
expenses to boost current year's earnings but it also lowers future cash flow in the long run. 
To estimate the average level of production, cost equation (4) is used. 
Prodit/Ait-1=β0 + β1 1/Ait-1 + β2Salesit/Ait-1 + β3∆Salesit/Ait-1 + β4∆Salest-1/Ait-1 + Ɛit(4) 
Where Prod is the summation of COGS and change in inventory  
Equation (4) is used to detect real earnings management through the cost of production. Firms to increase 
earnings increase production cost, but the firm will still spend on other production expenses, which will lead to 
an increase in annual production cost. This increment in production cost will lower cash inflows given the sales 
level.  
Also, the paper follows Cohen et al., (2008), to find the total effect of real earnings management, the paper 
combines the standardized residuals of the three real earnings management measures. This research reports the 
results of total REM and also the three individual measures for earnings management. 
REM = AB_CFO + AB_Disc.Exp + AB_Prod + Ɛ (5) 
Where:  
REM is the summation of three standardized proxies for real earnings management.                                                                                                                                  
Ab_CFO is abnormal cash flow from operations                                                                                                  
Ab_Disc.Exp is abnormal discretionary expenses 
Ab_Prod is abnormal production cost 
To test for the third primary hypothesis, two different OLS models combined with control variables are 
formulated. 
Sticky_Cost = β0 + β1 REM + β2 SIZE + β3 ROA + β4 ROE + Ɛ (6) 
Sticky_Cost = β0+ β1 Ab_CFO + β2 Ab_Disc.Exp + β3 Ab_Prod + β4 SIZE + β5 ROA + β6 ROE + Ɛ…. (7) 
Results and Discussion 
Table 1 OLS estimator for cost stickiness 
Model Coefficients Std. Error T 
Intercept -12.968** 6.269 -2.069 
log(Salesit/Salesit-1) 60.517*** 6.300 9.606 
Dummy × log(Salesit / Salesit-1) -65.979*** 10.744 -6.141 
***, **, * represent significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Log (SGAit / SGAit-1),       R Squared: 0.386          Adjusted R2: 0.376 
Where Sticky_Cost is sticky cost, size is the natural log of total assets, ROA is net income divided by lagged 
total assets, and ROE is net income divided by equity. This paper uses ROA, Size, and ROE as control variables 
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for firms' specific characteristics and also because real earnings management affects earnings in the case of 
ROA and ROE in comparison to accrual earnings management.  
The first primary hypothesis predicts that listed firms in Ghana exhibit sticky cost, and for this hypothesis not 
to be rejected, β2 has to be less than zero (0) or negative. From table 2.0, it is clear that β2   is negative (-65.979) 
and statistically significant, thereby implying that listed firms exhibit sticky cost (SG&A). Also, β1 records a 
positive figure of 60.517 which is significant; this implies that a 0.01 increase in sales leads to 60.517 increases 
in SG&A cost. The summation of β1 and β2 is -5.462 which implies a 0.01 decrease in sales leads to 5.462 
decreases in SG&A cost. This means firms listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange exhibit sticky SG&A and 
therefore the study decline to reject the first primary hypothesis. This is in line with the findings of He et al. 
(2010), who also find the SG&A of Japanese firms to be sticky. This finding also supports the findings of 
Anderson et al. (2003), who find US firms to have sticky SG&A. R squared from the table suggests that the 
linear combination of log (Salesit / Salesit-1) and Dummy × log(Salesit / Salesit-1) explains 38.6% of the variance 
in Log (SGAit / SGAit-1). The R
2 at least indicates a moderate explanatory power for the model.  
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for major variables 
Variable N Mean Median Std.dev. 
REM 139 0.1856 0.3595 2.65355 
Abn_Prod. 139 -0.0069 -0.0579 1.84733 
Abn_Disc.Exp 154 0.0204 0.1454 1.81782 
Abn_CFO 139 0.1469 0.2162 0.59293 
Sticky_Cost 154 8.5506 1.1675 86.42443 
ROE 168 0.8080 0.3928 2.86017 
ROA 168 0.1499 0.0406 1.04750 
Size 
Sales  
SG&A                                
168 
168 
168 
17.2582 
4.0269E9 
8.8565E8 
17.2067 
3.5118E7 
5.1366E6 
2.48823 
4.88178E10 
1.10581E10 
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics of the main variables. The variable REM recorded a mean of 0.1856 
(median, 0.3595). The data is skewed to the left from the indication of REM's mean and median. Abn_Prod 
recorded mean of -0.0069 (median, -0.0579), with Abn_Disc.Exp recording a mean of 0.0204 (median, 0.1454) 
and Abn_CFO also recording a mean of 0.1469 (median, 0.2162). Abn_CFO records the highest mean among 
the three real earnings management measures. From the table, sticky_Cost records the second largest mean of 
8.5506 (median, 1.1675). This also implies the data is right-skewed. ROE records a mean of 0.8080 (median, 
0.3928) whiles ROA records a mean of 0.1499 (median, 0.0406). In comparison, ROE recorded a higher mean. 
The variable Size recorded the most significant mean among all the variables; it had a mean of 17.2582 (median, 
17.2067). The size data appeared to be symmetric due to the closeness of its mean and median. Finally, Sales 
and SG&A respectively records a mean and a median of 4.0269E9 (3.5118E7) and 8.8565E8 (5.1366E6). 
Table 2displays the results that validate the second primary hypothesis. The hypothesis states that listed firms 
in Ghana manipulate earnings through real activities. Using the mean residuals from the table, Ab_CFO is 
positive and different from zero, indicating the presence of cash flow management activity. In comparison, 
Ab_CFO holds the highest mean residual among the three real earnings management measures. This suggests 
that listed firms on the Ghana Stock Exchange indulge in real activity manipulation through cash flow from 
operations more than through the cost of production and discretionary expenses. Ab_Disc.Exp records a 
positive mean residual, which is not the same as zero. This indicates the presence of real earnings management 
in the discretionary expenses. The summary seems to suggest that discretionary expenses are the second most 
used route for real earnings management among listed firms in Ghana. Also from table Ab_Prod records a 
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negative mean residual which suggests the presence of real earnings manipulations through the cost of 
production. These three individual measures of real earnings management all suggest that listed firms in Ghana 
manipulate earnings through real activities, and therefore the findings support the second primary hypothesis 
and also in line with the results of Roychowdhury (2006).Also, following Cohen et al. (2008), this paper 
combines abnormal levels of the three real earnings management measures to determine the full level. Table 2 
reports the mean residual for REM, which is the summation of all the abnormal levels. REM records a positive 
mean residual which is also different from zero indicating the presence of real earnings management among 
listed firms in Ghana. We, therefore, do not reject the second primary hypothesis.  
Table 3, as shown in the appendix, gives the estimation results for the three real earnings management measures. 
Table 3 Panel A relates to real earnings management through cash flow activities. The variable reciprocal of 
assets (1/A) records a negative coefficient and also not significant. Sales/A and ∆Sales/A are both significant 
at a 1% significance level and also records positive coefficients. Panel B presents the Disc.Exp model results. 
The reciprocal of assets (1/A) is negative and significant at the 10% significance level. The variable Sales/A is 
positive and also significant at a 1% significance level. Panel C presents the estimation results for the normal 
level of production cost (Prod/A). The reciprocal of assets records a positive coefficient, but the variable is not 
significant. Variable Sales/A is positive and also significant. ∆Sales/A has a negative impact on Prod/A and 
also significant. The final variable in the model is ∆Salest-1/A,it records a positive coefficient, but the variable 
is not significant.   
Table 4. Panel A; OLS estimator for the relationship between real earnings management and sticky cost. 
Model Coefficients Std. Error T 
Intercept              0.060 0.562 0.107 
REM              0.082*** 0.028 2.868 
SIZE 
ROA 
ROE 
             0.005        
             0.144 
            -0.121 
0.032 
0.298 
0.109 
0.157 
0.482 
-1.105 
***, **, * represent significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Sticky_Cost R squared: 0.66 Adjusted R2: 0.038 
To validate the third primary hypothesis, equation (6) and (7) are used. Table 4panel A contains the regression 
results for equation (6).  
From Panel A of Table 4, the variable REM reports a positive coefficient, and also, the variable is statistically 
significant at a 1% significance level. The coefficient of the variable implies a 0.01 increase in REM leads to a 
0.082 increase in sticky cost. This result supports the findings of Hemati and Javid (2017), who also find a 
significant effect of REM on sticky cost but in contrast to the findings of Xue & Hong (2015), who claims that 
as earnings management increases sticky cost reduces. The variables Size and ROA records positive coefficients 
but are not statistically significant. ROE has a negative impact on sticky costs. However, it is also not statistically 
significant. The results seem to suggest that REM, which is the summation of the three real earnings 
management measures, has a positive impact on sticky cost, and therefore real earnings management exhibits 
cost stickiness. The 6.6% of the variability in sticky cost behavior is explained by REM, ROA, ROE, and Size 
but REM was the only statistically significant variable. Thus, REM plays a significant role in firms' cost behavior 
being sticky. This is buttressed by the regression of REM on Sticky Cost behavior in table 5 (as shown in the 
appendix), which showed that 5.6% of the variability in sticky cost is explained by REM alone. We, therefore, 
cannot ignore REM as a determinant of sticky cost. The findings, therefore, support the third primary 
hypothesis. 
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Table 4. Panel B; OLS estimator for the relationship between the three individual real earnings management proxies and sticky 
cost. 
Model Coefficients Std. Error T 
Intercept               0.859 1.604 0.536 
Ab_CFO              -0.704* 0.401 -1.754 
Ab_Disc.Exp 
Ab_Prod 
Size 
ROA                                                                                     
ROE 
              0.265** 
              0.358*** 
              0.048  
0.672
             -0.128 
0.132 
0.124 
0.091 
0.835 
0.306 
2.003 
2.897 
0.524 
0.804 
-0.420 
***, **, * represent significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Sticky Cost R Squared: 0.126 Adjusted R2: 0.114 
Table 4, Panel B reports the regression results of equation (7) which also tries to validate the third primary 
hypothesis. From the table, Ab_CFO is significant at a 10% significant level. The variable has a negative impact 
on sticky cost, implying that a 0.01 increase in Ab_CFO reduces sticky cost by 0.704. The result seems to 
suggest that the more a firm indulges in real earnings management through cash flow from operations, the less 
sticky their SG&A cost becomes. The finding is in line with the finding of studies such as (Xue & Hong, 
2015;Koo et al., 2015). This result does not support the hypothesis, so we reject it. Ab_Disc.Exp is significant 
at a 5% significance level. The variable is positive, indicating a positive impact on sticky cost. The coefficient 
implies that a 0.01 increase in Ab_Disc.Exp also increases the sticky cost by 0.265. This explains that firms that 
manipulate earnings through discretionary expenses are more likely to exhibit sticky SG&A. These findings 
support the third primary hypothesis. The finding is also in line with the finding of (Hemati& Javid, 2017).The 
table also portrays Ab_Prod to be positive and statistically significant at a 1% significance level. The coefficient 
of the variable indicates that a 0.01 increase in Ab_Prod; there is a 0.358 increase in sticky SG&A. This also 
explains that firms that manipulate earnings through cost of production are more likely to exhibit sticky SG&A. 
This result also supports H3. The finding supports the finding of Hemati & Javid., (2017). 
The study revealed that in establishing a relationship between REM and sticky cost behavior, regressing 
individual measure of REM on sticky cost gives a much-desired result than computing them as one variable, as 
shown in Table 4, Panel A and Table 4, Panel B respectively. Thus, 12.6% variability in sticky cost is explained 
by measures Ab_CFO, Ab_Disc.Exp, Ab_Prod, Size, ROA, and ROEof REM as compared to the 6.6% when 
all measures are computed as one REM variable. 
Conclusion 
The study examines the relationship between real earnings management and the sticky behavior of SG&A cost 
of listed firms in Ghana. Both real earnings management and sticky behavior of cost arising due to the deliberate 
managerial intentions. Based on prior studies, we assume that real earnings management drives cost to behave 
asymmetrically. 
The findings of this study, first of all, validate the hypothesis that listed firms in Ghana exhibit sticky SG&A 
costs. Secondly, the findings answer the research question that listed firms in Ghana manipulate earnings 
through real activities. Thirdly, the findings answer the research question that firms that engaged in real earnings 
management exhibited sticky SG&A costs. 
The findings support the hypothesis that listed firms in Ghana exhibit sticky SG&A costs. The results show 
that for every 0.01 increase in sales, there are 60.517 increases in SG&A; however, when sales decrease by 0.01, 
SG&A decreases by 5.462 indicating sticky SG&A. In line with prior studies, this paper also found cost to be 
sticky. Also, the findings support the hypothesis that listed firms in Ghana manipulate earnings through real 
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activities. Finally, the findings support the hypothesis that firms that engaged in real earnings management 
exhibited sticky SG&A costs. The results show that real earnings management had a positive effect on sticky 
SG&A costs. However, when the three individual real earnings management measures (Abnormal cash flow, 
abnormal production cost, and abnormal discretionary expenses) were regressed on sticky SG&A cost, 
abnormal cash flow recorded a negative effect on sticky SG&A cost. Indicating that real earnings management 
through cash flow does not exhibit sticky SG&A cost. Nonetheless, real earnings management through 
production cost and discretionary expenses recorded positive effects on sticky SG&A costs. 
This study contributes to the literature by examining real earnings management and sticky cost from a 
developing economy. The study also contributes to other studies by examining the relationship between each 
of the three real earnings management measures and sticky cost and also examines the total effect of the three 
real earnings management measures on sticky cost. Since real earnings management affects earnings, the study 
proposes that investors should adopt empirical methods in investigating firms' cost behavior and the presence 
or the absence of real earnings management before making final decisions. For future studies, the researcher 
suggests a bigger sample test of these theories to get a much clearer picture. Also, in the Ghanaian context, total 
cost should be tested for stickiness.  
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Appendix 
Table 3.  
Panel A; Estimation of normal level of cash flow from operations 
Model Coefficients Std. Error T 
Intercept -0.223 0.145 -1.542 
1/Ait-1 -0.002 0.004 -0.441 
Salesit/Ait-1 
∆Salesit/Ait-1 
0.095*** 
0.239*** 
0.011 
0.011 
8.265 
20.838 
***, **, * represent significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Dependent Variable: CFOit/Ait-1 
Panel B; Estimation of normal level of Discretionary expenses 
Model Coefficients Std. Error T 
Intercept -0.133 0.173 -0.768 
1/Ait-1 -0.008* 0.004 -1.818 
Salesit/Ait-1 0.226*** 0.000 553.715 
***, **, * represent significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Disc.Expit/Ait-1  
Panel C; Estimation of normal level of production cost 
Model Coefficients Std. Error T 
Intercept -0.053 0.194 -0.272 
1/Ait-1  0.001 0.006   0.103 
Salesit/Ait-1 
∆Salesit/Ait-1 
∆Salest-1/Ait-1 
0.848*** 
-0.234** 
 0.065 
0.026 
0.108 
0.093 
32.086 
 -2.171 
  0.696 
***, **, * represent significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Prodit/Ait-1                         
Table 5; OLS estimator for the relationship between real earnings management and sticky cost. 
Model Coefficients Std. Error T 
Intercept 0.086 0.074 1.152 
REM 0.080*** 0.028 2.857 
***, **, * represent significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Sticky Cost R2: 0.056 Adjusted R2: 0.049 
